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Consider the following scenario:1 Company X has an employee
benefits plan that provides retirement benefits to employees who are
sixty-five years old and have twenty years of service with the company.
Company X's benefits plan also contains a Job Separation Provision
that states that, in the event of a plant shutdown, employees who are
at least fifty years old with twenty years of service will receive sup-
plemental early retirement benefits. These Job Separation Benefits do
not reduce the pension amount that employees will receive upon
reaching age sixty-five. John Smith is an employee at Company X. He
is fifty-one years old, and has worked for Company X for thirty years.
His normal retirement benefits beginning at age sixty-five would be
$1,000 per month. Under the Job Separation Provision, he will receive
unreduced benefits in the amount of $1,000 per month beginning at
the time of the plant closure. Company X decides to eliminate the Job
Separation Provision from its employee benefits plan and shortly af-
terward closes the plant at which Smith works.
Under the anticutback rule2 in the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), Company X is prohibited from re-
ducing or eliminating Smith's normal pension benefits, whether he be-
gins receiving them at age sixty-five or whether he retires at age fifty-
five, and the $1,000 monthly amount is reduced to reflect the earlier
payout and longer annuity period. Pension benefits that begin at nor-
mal retirement age, and those received for an early retirement that are
actuarially reduced, are protected because they are considered "ac-
crued benefits."4 The anticutback provision also prohibits reduction of
a "retirement-type subsidy," although it does not define that term. In
the absence of a clear definition of "retirement-type subsidy," courts
disagree on whether supplemental early retirement benefits that are
t B.B.A. 1994, The University of Michigan; J.D. Candidate 2002, The University of Chi-
cago.
1 The facts are based on Bellas v CBS, Inc, 221 F3d 517 (3d Cir 2000).
2 29 USC § 1054(g) (1994).
3 29 USC §§ 1001 et seq (1994 & Supp 1998).
4 ERISA defines "accrued benefits" as "an annual benefit commencing at normal retire-
ment age." 29 USC § 1002(23) (1994). The anticutback rule also provides that early retirement
benefits are to be considered accrued benefits. 29 USC § 1054(g).
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contingent on an event such as a plant shutdown are "accrued bene-
fits" subject to anticutback protection.!
The question of whether contingent early retirement benefits can
be cut back reflects the underlying tension between two of ERISA's
primary goals: protecting employees and minimizing pension costs.
6
Toward the end of containing pension costs, ERISA requires that all
employee benefit plans be amendable,' qualified only by the anticut-
back provision in ERISA Section 204(g). The anticutback provision is
an exception to the broad goal of employer flexibility, and its protec-
tion is limited to accrued benefits. Anticutback protection for early
retirement benefits contingent on a plant shutdown is an important is-
sue. For an employee facing a job separation, it may mean that the
employee receives less than one-third of the income he expected.9 The
employee may also agree to continue to work at a plant despite an
impending shutdown, only to have his benefits eliminated. On the
other hand, employers may find themselves locked into plant shut-
down benefits and stripped of the flexibility they thought they had to
amend benefits as business needs dictate. These benefits may have a
significant impact on plant shutdown costs, a particularly important
concern because plant shutdown benefits are often offered in troubled
industries, such as steel or automotive.'
This Comment argues that early retirement benefits contingent
on a plant shutdown should be protected by the anticutback rule. Part
I examines the background of ERISA and the Retirement Equity
Act's" amendments to the anticutback provision. It also discusses
ERISA's treatment of contingent events for funding and tax purposes.
Part II examines the anticutback provision's language and legislative
history and concludes that neither unambiguously manifests an intent
to include contingent early retirement benefits.
Part III argues that, given the unclear statutory language and leg-
islative history, additional considerations justify the application of the
anticutback provision to contingent retirement benefits. In particular,
5 See Part I.B.
6 Mertens v Hewitt Associates, 508 US 248, 262-63 (1993) ("There is ... a 'tension between
the primary [ERISA] goal of benefiting employees and the subsidiary goal of containing pension
costs."'), quoting Alessi v Raybestos-Manhattan, 451 US 504,515 (1981).
7 29 USC § 1102(b)(3) (1994).
8 29 USC § 1054(g)(1) (1994).
9 Jim McKay, Appeals Court Upholds Benefit of Engineer, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette C5
(Aug 20,2000) (noting that Bellas was paid $83,000, not the $300,000 he expected).
10 Richard Hylton, Don't Panic about Your Pension Yet, Fortune 121 (April 18, 1994) (de-
scribing industry concentration of shutdown benefits); see also Richard A. Ippolito, The Eco-
nomics of Pension Insurance 117-18 (Irwin 1998) (describing special early retirement plans by
industry).
11 Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub L No 98-397, 98 Stat 1426, codified in various sec-
tions of title 29.
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Part III.A argues that these benefits should be protected because of
the strong employee expectations in receiving them. Part III.B ad-
dresses concerns that employers should be able to amend shutdown
benefits because they cannot prefund for them. This section concludes
that the anticutback rule does not need to be interpreted to exclude
these benefits because the provision already contains a waiver of
funding liability for employers who will face a substantial business
hardship. Further, the ERISA statutory scheme shifts the risk of un-
derfunding away from employees to the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation ("PBGC") through ERISA's termination insurance pro-
gram. Part III.C argues that the Internal Revenue Service's contrary
interpretation, which does not extend the anticutback provision to
contingent benefits, is not controlling. Finally, Part III.D concludes
that employers will still have incentives to offer this type of benefit,
even if the anticutback provision is applied.
I. THE RETIREMENT EQUITY AcT AND ERISA's TREATMENT OF
CONTINGENT EVENTS
This Part examines the current law related to ERISA's treatment
of contingent early retirement benefits. Part L.A provides background
on ERISA's anticutback provision12 and the amendments made in the
Retirement Equity Act of 1984 ("REA"). Part I.B discusses the
difficulties courts have had in applying the REA amendments and the
split of authority on their application to retirement benefits
contingent on a plant shutdown. Part I.C explains the IRS's
interpretation of the anticutback provision and its relationship to
ERISA liability. Finally, Part I.D discusses the treatment of contingent
events in ERISA's funding provisions and the constraint these
provisions place on employers' ability to prefund contingent benefits.
A. ERISA and the Retirement Equity Act of 1984
Congress enacted ERISA primarily to ensure that employees
who are promised pension benefits receive them. Congress was par-
ticularly concerned that "many employees with long years of employ-
ment [were] losing anticipated retirement benefits" due to inade-
quately funded pension plans." In response, ERISA provides for
minimum funding and vesting schedules, establishes standards of con-
duct for benefit plan administrators, and sets out reporting require-
ments." ERISA does not direct employers to create a pension plan or
12 29 USC § 1054(g).
13 29 USC § 1001(a) (1994 & Supp 1998). See also Nachman Corp v Pension Benefit Guar-
anty Corp, 446 US 359,374-75 (1980) (discussing ERISA's goals).
14 ERISA is divided into four titles. Title I of ERISA contains reporting, funding, and vest-
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provide certain benefits, but rather guarantees the benefits that are
promised.5
Although ERISA's primary concern is protecting employee ex-
pectations, it attempts to do so while minimizing pension costs to em-
ployers. To this end, employee benefit plans must generally be amend-
able.16 For example, employers are generally able to change the level
of medical benefits they offer17 or amend plan terms to comply with
tax and regulatory changes." The employer's flexibility to amend is
qualified only by the anticutback provision in ERISA Section 204(g).'9
The anticutback provision prohibits employers from reducing partici-
pants' "accrued benefits," defined as benefits that begin at "normal re-
tirement age,"20 as well as early retirement benefits and retirement-
type subsidies.
Prior to 1984, employers were free to reduce, or even altogether
eliminate, early retirement benefits without violating ERISA.2' The
REA was enacted as an attempt to close the gap in protection for
early retirement benefits by expanding the scope of what is consid-
ered an accrued benefit. The REA amended ERISA section 204(g) to
prohibit employers from "eliminating or reducing an early-retirement
benefit or a retirement-type subsidy.,
22
ERISA does not define either "early-retirement benefit" or "re-
tirement-type subsidy." However, an "early-retirement benefit" is gen-
erally considered to be the retirement benefit that would begin at
ing provisions and provides for enforcement. 29 USC § 1001-86 (1994). Title II amended the In-
ternal Revenue Code to conform to Title I standards. 29 USC §§ 1101-91 (1994 & Supp 1998).Ti-
tle III provides for coordination of enforcement. 29 USC §§ 1201-32 (1994 & Supp 1998). Title
IV established termination insurance to protect employees when underfunded plans terminate
and created a federal agency to oversee terminations. 29 USC §§ 1301-99 (1994 & Supp 1998).
See Nachman, 446 US at 361-62 n 1.
15 Lockheed Corp v Spink, 517 US 882,887 (1996) (noting that nothing in ERISA requires
plans to be established or to contain certain benefits, but that ERISA seeks to ensure that em-
ployees received guaranteed benefits).
16 29 USC § 1102(b)(3).
17 See, for example, McGann v H & H Music Co, 946 F2d 401,408 (5th Cir 1991) (finding
that employer's decision to limit medical benefits payable for AIDS-related claims does not vio-
late ERISA).
18 John H. Langbein and Bruce A. Wolk, Pension and Employee Benefit Law 138 (Founda-
tion 2d ed 1995) (noting that section 402(b)(3) allows amendments incorporating tax and regula-
tory changes).
19 Id at 138-39 (discussing the anticutback provision's limitation on the broad goal of
flexibility to amend).
20 29 USC § 1002(23).
21 See, for example, Bencivenga v Western Pennsylvania Teamsters and Employers Pension
Fund, 763 F2d 574,577 (3d Cir 1985) (finding that ERISA's plain language and legislative history
provide no protection for early retirement benefits); Sutton v Weirton Steel Division of National
Steel Corp, 724 F2d 406, 410 (4th Cir 1983) (same); Hernandez v Southern Nevada Culinary &
Bartenders Pension Trust, 662 F2d 617,619 (9th Cir 1981) (same).
22 Retirement Equity Act, 98 Stat at 1426.
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normal retirement age, actuarially reduced to reflect its commence-
ment at an earlier date.3 For example, if Smith's normal retirement
benefits were $1,000 per month beginning at the normal retirement
age of sixty-five, he would not receive $1,000 per month if he retires
early. Instead, benefits may be reduced to $600 to take into account
the longer annuity period and the loss of investment income on the
benefits before payout."
The term "retirement-type subsidy," on the other hand, does not
have a commonly understood usage." Instead, Congress contemplated
that Treasury regulations would be promulgated to define this term.26
To date, no regulations have been provided." In the absence of a regu-
lation, several courts have defined a retirement-type subsidy as the
excess value over the actuarial equivalent of the normal retirement
benefit.2 For example, if Smith's actuarially reduced retirement bene-
fit were $600 per month beginning at age sixty, any amount Smith re-
ceives above $600 would be considered a retirement-type subsidy.
Benefits contingent on a plant shutdown include both the actu-
arially reduced normal retirement benefits, plus an additional amount
to compensate for the shutdown. Under these definitions, for the anti-
cutback provision to apply to the supplemental benefits, this excess
over the normal retirement benefits must be categorized as a retire-
ment-type subsidy.
B. Application of the REA Amendments
Courts generally agree that the REA provisions provide anticut-
back protection for an early retirement benefit that depends only on
23 See Dan M. McGill and Donald S. Grubbs, Jr., Fundamentals of Private Pensions 131-35
(Pension Research Council 6th ed 1989), quoted in Langbein and Wolk, Pension and Employee
Benefit Law at 378-80 (cited in note 18) (explaining actuarial reduction of early retirement
benefits).
24 See id.
25 Arndt v Security Bank S.SB. Employees' Pension Plan, 182 F3d 538, 542 (7th Cir 1999)
("It may seem that § 204(g)(2) raises more questions than it answers, the basic one being what
exactly is a 'retirement-type subsidy.' . . . Unfortunately there is no regulation yet promulgated
which defines the term. We are on our own.").
26 Section 204(g) specifically proscribes reduction of "a retirement-type subsidy (as de-
fined in the regulations)." 29 USC § 1054(g).
27 The Treasury Department has discussed subsidized early retirement benefits in defining
what is an accrued benefit under the Internal Revenue Code's anticutback provision. These
regulations fail, however, to provide a definition for the term "retirement-type subsidy." See 26
USC § 1.411(d)-(4) (2000).
28 See, for example, Bellas v CBS, Inc, 221 F3d 517, 533 (3d Cir 2000) (reasoning that the
description is consistent with the IRS's interpretation of benefit subsidy); Costantino v TRW, Inc,
13 F3d 969,977-78 (6th Cir 1994) (finding the subsidized benefit to be the annuity amount avail-
able that exceeds the amount available at the normal retirement age). This is consistent with the
definition of "benefit subsidy" provided in the Senate Report on the REA. See Retirement Eq-
uity Act, S Rep 98-575, 98th Cong, 2d Sess 28 (1984), reprinted in 1984 USCCAN 2547,2574.
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meeting age or service requirements. For example, assume Company
X provides early retirement benefits upon reaching fifty-five years of
age and twenty years of service. If John Smith meets both these condi-
tions, all circuits that have addressed the issue hold that Section
204(g)'s anticutback protection applies and the employer cannot
eliminate these benefits." If Smith is only forty-five and has not yet
met the age requirement, Company X still may not amend the bene-
fits." Smith must be given an opportunity to "grow into" his benefits.3"
Courts diverge when the early retirement benefits not only de-
pend on age and service requirements, but also on an unpredictable
event, such as a plant shutdown. For example, assume that Company
X's benefits plan includes $1,000 per month in retirement benefits be-
ginning at age sixty-five. The plan also provides that employees who
meet age and service requirements will receive unreduced early re-
tirement benefits in the amount of $1,000 per month beginning at age
fifty-five in the event of a plant shutdown. If Smith is fifty-five when
the plant shuts down, he will begin receiving a total of $1,000 per
month, which will continue past age sixty-five.
Smith's benefits can be categorized several ways. One way is to
see Smith as receiving $1,000 in plant shutdown benefits that end at
age sixty-five, at which point his normal retirement benefits begin. On
another view, Smith is receiving $600 in actuarially reduced early re-
tirement benefits beginning at fifty-five, plus an additional $400 plant
shutdown subsidy that begins at age fifty-five and continues past re-
tirement. Circuits disagree over the proper distinction between these
benefits and whether the amount of benefits above the actuarially re-
duced pension amount constitutes a retirement-type subsidy protected
by the anticutback rule.
1. Cases finding contingent benefits protected.
Relying on Section 204(g)'s language and legislative history, sev-
eral courts have held that the anticutback provision extends to contin-
gent early retirement benefits. The Third Circuit considered the issue
of retirement benefits triggered by a plant shutdown in Bellas v CBS,
29 Ahng vAllsteel, Inc, 96 F3d 1033, 1037-38 (7th Cir 1996) (finding that plaintiffs meeting
these requirements can state a claim under Section 204(g)); Costantino, 13 F3d at 977-78 (same);
Hunger v AB, 12 F3d 118,120 (8th Cir 1993) (same); Gillis v Hoechst Celanese Corp, 4 F3d 1137,
1143-44 (3d Cir 1993) (same); Harms v Cavenham Forest Industries, Inc, 984 F2d 686, 692 (5th
Cir 1993) (same); Aldridge v Lily-Tulip, Inc, 953 F2d 587,590 (11th Cir 1992) (same); Amato v
Western Union International, Inc, 773 F2d 1402, 1410 (2d Cir 1985) (same).
30 See, for example, Gillis, 4 F3d at 1147-48.
31 Id (finding that employees who work for a successor employer can continue to accumu-
late years of service for the purpose of retirement benefits); Ahng, 96 F3d at 1036 (accepting
employee's right o "grow into" early retirement benefits).
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Inc." As a CBS employee, Harry Bellas participated in CBS's West-
inghouse Plan, which provided a special early retirement benefit for
employees terminated as a result of a "Permanent Job Separation. ' 33
In 1994, CBS amended the plan to make it more difficult to qualify for
benefits." Three years later, Bellas challenged the plan amendment
under Section 204(g) after CBS terminated his employment and de-
nied him early retirement benefits.5
The Bellas court held that Section 204(g) extends to contingent
early retirement benefits. Relying on legislative history,5 the court
reasoned that Congress only intended to exclude plant shutdown
benefits that end at the normal retirement age from anticutback pro-
tection." The court also concluded from the legislative history that the
benefits are accrued and therefore protected from reduction immedi-
ately upon creation." In extending the anticutback provision in Bellas,
the Third Circuit acknowledged that its holding was inconsistent with
actuarial practice and ERISA's treatment of contingent events for
funding purposes. However, the court noted that "it does not appear
that the statute or its legislative history requires or compels such con-
sistency."°
The Ninth Circuit also read Section 204(g)'s legislative history
and language to conclude that contingent plant shutdown benefits
were protected under Section 204(g), although its opinion was later
withdrawn on other grounds." In Richardson v Pension Plan of Beth-
lehem Steel Corp,' former employees of Bethlehem Steel challenged
32 221 F3d 517 (3d Cir 2000).
33 The Westinghouse Plan defines "Permanent Job Separation" more broadly than just a
plant shutdown, and includes "the termination of the employment of an Employee ... through
no fault of his own through lack of work for reasons associated with the business for whom [the
employer] determines there is no reasonable expectation of recall." Id at 520.
34 Id at 520-21. Under the 1994 plan, Bellas's benefits included the full retirement pension,
plus additional monthly benefits keyed to the number of years of service. Id at 520.
35 Idat521.
36 Id at 532 ("[U]npredictable contingent event benefits that provide a benefit greater than
the actuarially reduced normal retirement benefits are retirement-type subsidies, and therefore
are accrued benefits under section 204(g), if the benefit continues beyond normal retirement
age.").
37 The Bellas court relied specifically on the Senate Report on the Retirement Equity Act,
S Rep No 98-575 at 30, reprinted in 1984 USCCAN at 2576 (cited in note 28).
38 Bellas, 221 F3d at 532-33.
39 Id at 534-35.
40 Idat535.
41 The opinion was later withdrawn on rehearing when the Ninth Circuit reversed its hold-
ing that a settlement agreement constituted an amendment that triggered Section 204(g). Be-
cause there was no amendment, the court did not reach the question on rehearing of whether
Section 204(g) applies to these benefits. See Richardson v Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp,
112 F3d 982,987 (9th Cir 1997).
42 67 F3d 1462 (9th Cir 1995), withdrawn on rehearing, 112 F3d 982 (9th Cir 1997). The
benefits plan provided benefits for employees who met age and service requirements, and whose
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an agreement they had previously made, under which a plant sale
would not trigger shutdown benefits. The Richardson court broadly
concluded that the shutdown benefits constituted a retirement-type
subsidy because their sum was greater than the total of the employees'
normal, unreduced retirement benefits.3 The court then narrowed its
definition of retirement-type subsidy by reading Section 204(g)'s legis-
lative history to include benefits contingent on a plant shutdown only
if they extend beyond retirement age."
Although the plan calculated the shutdown benefits with refer-
ence to normal retirement benefits, the Richardson court found the
shutdown benefits at issue to fit this definition. The court stated that
the shutdown benefits were not "miraculously transformed into nor-
mal retirement benefits when the recipient reaches" the normal re-
tirement age, but began at the time of shutdown and continued until
death."5
The Fifth Circuit also addressed the application of Section 204(g)
to contingent retirement benefits in Harms v Cavenham Forest Indus-
tries," but focused its analysis on the characteristics of the benefits.
Crown Zellerbach, which later sold a subsidiary to Cavenham Forest
Industries, developed a benefits plan that included early retirement
benefits contingent on a "change in control."', When the change in
control took place, many of Crown Zellerbach's operating units were
sold and their employees were terminated. Shortly after the sale,
Crown Zellerbach eliminated the contingent early retirement bene-
fits4
The Harms court examined the characteristics of the benefits in
Crown Zellerbach's plan and concluded that the benefits were pro-
tected under Section 204(g).9 The court distinguished the contingent
retirement benefits from severance or other welfare benefits, which
are not subject to anticutback protection.' In particular, the court
"continuous service [was] broken by reason of a permanent shutdown of a plant." Id at 1464. The
employer and the union disagreed over whether the sale of a division constituted a "permanent
shutdown" that would trigger the benefits. After negotiations, the union agreed that a proposed
plant sale would not trigger the benefits, in exchange for cash payments to employees. Id at 1465.
43 Id.
44 Id ("We read the Senate Report to mean that shutdown benefits that do continue after
retirement age are a retirement-type subsidy.").
45 Id at 1469.
4 984 F2d 687 (5th Cir 1993). The Harms court noted that its holding was consistent with
an earlier district court case that also concluded that the benefits in Cavenham's plan were a re-
tirement-type subsidy. See Harms, 984 F2d at 692, citing Wallace v Cavenham Forest Industries,
707 F Supp 455,460 (D Or 1989).
47 Harms, 984 F2d at 688.
48 Id at 688. The employees challenged the amendments, arguing they were eligible under
both Cavenham's and Crown Zellerbach's benefits plans. Id.
49 Id at 692.
50 Id at 691 n 6. The term "severance plan" generally refers to benefits made in a lump sum
1348 [68:1341
ERISA's Anticutback Rule
found support in the fact that the contingent benefits are payable for
life, and are calculated similarly to other retirement benefits.'
2. Cases finding that contingent benefits are not protected.
The courts that have found that contingent retirement benefits
are not protected under Section 204(g) also rely on statutory language
and the same legislative history.12 The Sixth Circuit concluded that
benefits contingent on a plant shutdown can never be protected under
Section 204(g) in Ross v Pension Plan for Hourly Employees of SKF
Industries, Inc.3 Ross involved early retirement benefits payable upon
the shutdown of a facility of SKF Industries.- Employees who met the
age and service requirements for SKF's plant shutdown benefits chal-
lenged their denial of benefits after the shutdown.
The Sixth Circuit focused on Section 204(g)'s legislative history,
which provides that "[t]he committee expects, however, that ... a plant
shutdown benefit (that does not continue past retirement age) will not
be considered a retirement-type subsidy."" The Sixth Circuit read the
express mention of plant shutdown benefits in the Senate Report as
evidence that Congress did not intend to extend anticutback protec-
tion to this type of benefit. With no further explanation or analysis, the
court concluded that "[t]he legislative history of the Retirement Eq-
uity Act, however, specifically addresses the question of whether a
plant shutdown benefit falls within the category of a retirement-type
subsidy and specifically states that it does not.""
Another court has also found that plant shutdown benefits may
never be considered within Section 204(g), although it is unclear
whether the court intended to exclude all contingent benefits or only
those benefits triggered by a plant shutdown. In Blank v Bethlehem
Steel Corp,"7 employees of Bethlehem Steel's Buffalo Tank Division
were transferred to the Buffalo Tank Corporation upon the sale of the
payment, calculated with reference to length of service, and offered to employees terminated for
a reason other than cause. Langbein and Wolk, Pension and Employee Benefit Law at 821 (cited
in note 18). The purpose of severance plans is to provide a form of short-term unemployment
compensation, rather than serving as a bonus to workers who are laid off or otherwise dismissed.
Id. The term "welfare plan" refers more generally to plans that provide nonretirement benefits
such as health care benefits, death or disability benefits, or vacation plans. See 29 USC § 1002(1).
A severance plan is considered a type of welfare plan. See 29 USC § 1002(B)(i).
51 Harms, 984 F2d at 692.
52 S Rep No 98-575 at 30, reprinted in 1984 USCCAN at 2576 (cited in note 28). See also
note 44.
53 847 F2d 329,333 (6th Cir 1988).
54 Id at 330-31.
55 Id at 333-34, quoting S Rep No 98-575 at 30, reprinted in 1984 USCCAN at 2576 (cited
in note 28).
56 Ross, 847 F2d at 333.
57 758 F Supp 697 (M D Fla 1990).
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plant at which they were employed. The employees challenged their
denial of contingent early retirement benefits under Section 204(g)."
The court initially relied on pre-REA case law to hold that there
is no obligation under ERISA to pay "unfunded, contingent early re-
tirement benefits or severance benefits."59 This language suggests that
all contingent benefits, rather than just those related to a plant shut-
down, are outside the scope of Section 204(g). In a footnote and with
no explanation of its reasoning, however, the Blank court stated that
the result is the same under the anticutback provision as amended by
the REA. The court cited Ross for support, noting in the parentheti-
cal that "plant shutdown benefits [are] not within [the] protection of
1054(g). '1
C. Internal Revenue Code Treatment of Contingent
Shutdown Benefits
When Congress enacted ERISA, it also revised the Internal
Revenue Code ("IRC") to give favorable tax treatment to benefit
plans that comply with ERISA's requirements. The IRC provisions are
intended to encourage employers to establish voluntary pension
plans,6 and have been described as the "bedrock" upon which em-
ployer-sponsored pension plans are built.3 When a pension plan meets
the requirements in the IRC, it is said to be "qualified" for tax bene-
fits,M' including deductions for plan contributions, exemptions for the
contributions until they are paid out to employees, and exemptions for
income on the trust containing the funds.6'
58 Id at 698-700.
59 Blank, 758 F Supp at 700, quoting Sutton v Weirton Steel Division, 724 F2d 406,410 (4th
Cir 1983).
60 Id at 700 n 3. The footnote provided that:
The Court has also considered the application of 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g), a provision enacted by
Congress in 1984 to protect accrued early retirement benefits. The result is unchanged. See
Ross v. Pension Plan for Hourly Employees of SKF Indus., 847 F2d 329, 332-34 (6th Cir.
1988) (plant shutdown benefits not within protection of § 1054(g)), cited with approval in
Roper, 859 F2d at 1474.
Id.
61 Id.
62 Gillis v Hoechst Celanese Corp, 4 F3d 1137, 1144 n 6 (3d Cir 1993) (noting that "many
ERISA sections have such counterparts in the IRC ... to encourage employers to establish pen-
sion plans"), citing Plucinski v 1A.M. National Pension Fund, 875 F2d 1052, 1058 (3d Cir 1989).
63 Stephen R. Bruce, Pension Claims: Rights and Obligations 5-6 (BNA 2d ed 1992) (dis-
cussing the tax advantages available to employers).
64 Langbein and Wolk, Pension and Employee Benefit Law at 149-50 (cited in note 18)
(discussing aspects of tax qualification).
65 26 USC § 501(a) (2000); 26 USC § 402(a) (2000). Deferred taxes on the earnings are of
particular importance to employees because they are usually in a lower tax bracket at the time of




In order to be considered a "qualified plan," the benefits plan
must meet the IRC's detailed requirements, many of which duplicate
ERISA's provisions." ERISA's Section 204(g) anticutback provision
has a counterpart in IRC section 411(d)(6), which also prohibits plan
amendments that have the effect of "eliminating or reducing an early
retirement benefit or a retirement-type subsidy."6'7
The IRS clearly addressed the application of IRC § 411(d)(6) to
contingent plant shutdown benefits in General Counsel Memorandum
("GCM") 39869.8 The GCM concludes that an early retirement bene-
fit contingent on a plant shutdown is not considered to be an accrued
benefit, and therefore is not subject to anticutback protection, until
the event on which it is contingent actually occurs. " The IRS based its
interpretation on the REA's legislative history and ERISA's funding
provisions, which do not require the benefits to be funded until the
triggering event occurs."' Under this interpretation, the IRS would not
disqualify a plan if the employer eliminates contingent plant shutdown
benefits, provided the shutdown has not yet taken place. If ERISA
Section 204(g) is interpreted to apply to plant shutdown benefits, an
employer who amends these benefits may face ERISA liability but
will not suffer any tax consequences.
D. ERISA's Funding Requirements for Contingent Benefits
Much of ERISA's detailed regulatory scheme addresses the level
at which an employer must fund a benefits plan. Funding provisions in
both ERISA and the IRC define the employer's funding obligations.
Congress directly addressed funding for contingent events in the Om-
nibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 ("OBRA"). 7' Under the
funding provisions as amended by OBRA, unpredictable contingent
events are not taken into account in determining funding obligations
66 If an employer violates a requirement in the IRC, the result is that the plan is disquali-
fied, and tax advantages will be lost. This is distinct from a violation of ERISA, which affects the
substantive rights of employees and their beneficiaries. Langbein and Wolk, Pension and Em-
ployee Benefit Law at 161 (cited in note 18). ERISA covers plans that are not tax qualified as
well, but in most cases ERISA and the IRC overlap and both apply. Bruce, Pension Claims at 9-
10 (cited in note 63).
67 26 USC § 411(d)(6)(B)(i).
68 General Counsel Memorandum 39869 (Apr 6, 1992), available on Lexis at 1992 IRS
GCM LEXIS 15 (providing technical advice regarding the presence of plant shutdown benefits
in a tax qualified plan).
69 Id ("Shutdown benefits that are retirement-type benefits, and are not ancillary benefits,
become an accrued benefit and therefore protected under section 411(d)(6) upon the occurrence
of the event that triggers the right to the benefits (i.e., the contingent event).") (emphasis added).
70 See Part I.D.
71 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub L No 100-203, 101 Stat 1330, codified
in various section of the United States Code.
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until the triggering event occurs.72 OBRA's legislative history makes
clear that, for plant shutdowns, the employer is not obligated to fund
the benefits until the shutdown takes place.
73
Although ERISA provides only the minimum funding standard,
the statutory scheme nonetheless limits the employer's ability to set
aside funds to cover contingent benefits. While ERISA acts as a floor
on employer contributions, the corresponding IRC provisions act as a
ceiling by limiting the deductions an employer may take for plan con-
tributions." The employer is unable to deduct contributions above this
maximum level, which does not include contingent benefits.75 Not only
is the employer's incentive to prefund reduced,76 but additional fund-
ing may trigger taxation on the income from the trust in which the
funds are held.7
A second obstacle to the employer's ability to prefund plant
shutdown benefits is the difficulty in determining the appropriate
level of funding. Plan actuaries calculate funding levels based on as-
sumptions that take into account factors such as interest rates and
projected work force changes." ERISA requires each assumption to
be reasonable in light of plan experience and "reasonable expecta-
tions."9 Actuaries have difficulty estimating contingent shutdown
72 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, HR Rep No 100-495, 100th Cong, 1st Sess
842 (1987), codified at 29 USC § 1082(d)(7)(B)(i) ("[A]ny unpredictable contingent event bene-
fit shall not be taken into account until the event on which the benefit is contingent occurs.").
73 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, HR Rep No 100-391, 100th Cong, 1st Sess 717
(1987), reprinted in 1987 USCCAN 2313, 2313-78 ("[L]iability for any benefit contingent on (1)
a facility shutdown, (2) a reduction or contraction in workforce, or (3) any event that cannot re-
liably and reasonably be predicted (as determined under regulations) is not to be taken into ac-
count until such shutdown, reduction or contraction, or other event occurs.").
74 Langbein and Wolk, Pension and Employee Benefit Law at 286 (cited in note 18). This
limitation on the ability of the employer to prefund under the IRC reflects the underlying ten-
sion between the IRC's goals and ERISA's purposes. Because the IRC is concerned with increas-
ing revenues and reducing deductions, it favors limiting the amount of deductible contributions.
At the same time, ERISA is concerned with encouraging companies to fund their pension plans
adequately to meet employees' expected benefits. See David Vise, Firms Stuck Between IRS and
US Pension Agency, Wash Post Fl (Feb 13, 1993) (discussing conflicting goals between ERISA
and the IRC).
75 The IRC limits the employer's maximum deductible amount by the "full funding limita-
tion." 26 USC § 404(a)(1)(A) (2000). The "full funding limitation" is calculated as a percentage
of current plan liabilities, IRC § 412(c)(7)(A)-(B), which do not include contingent benefits until
the triggering event occurs, 26 USC § 412(l)(7) (2000).
76 See text accompanying notes 62-65.
77 26 USC §§ 402(b), 404(a)(5), 501(a) (2000). See also Brief of Amicus Curiae Association
of Private Pension and Welfare Plans in Support of Appellants, Bellas v CBS, Inc, No 99-3775,
123-24 (3d Cir filed Nov 22,1999) (discussing the potential tax ramifications of prefunding).
78 See Langbein and Wolk, Pension and Employee Benefit Law at 274 (cited in note 18).
79 29 USC § 1082(c)(3)(A)(i) (1994). Prior to 1987, actuarial assumptions only had to be
reasonable in the aggregate. The 1987 Pension Protection Act amended ERISA to require that
each individual assumption be reasonable. Pension Protection Act of 1987, Pub L No 100-203,
§ 9307(b)(1), 101 Stat 1330, amending 29 USC § 1082.
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benefits in particular because they are based largely on management
decisions, rather than historical data.8n Employers would therefore be
unlikely to prefund at an appropriate level to cover contingent bene-
fits, even if they wanted to do so, out of concern that their assumptions
are not "reasonable."
In summary, because Congress left the question of exactly what
constitutes a retirement-type subsidy within the anticutback rule un-
answered, there have been diverging views on whether the term in-
cludes benefits contingent on a plant shutdown. Several circuits have
held that this type of benefit is protected as long as it continues past
normal retirement age, while both the Sixth Circuit and one district
court have concluded that plant shutdown benefits can never be con-
sidered a retirement-type subsidy. At the same time, the IRS has in-
terpreted its counterpart of the anticutback provision as not including
plant shutdown benefits until the triggering event occurs. This inter-
pretation, based in part on ERISA's funding provisions, allows em-
ployers to reduce contingent early retirement benefits without losing
tax advantages.
II. APPLICATION OF THE ANTICUTBACK PROVISION AS A MATI'ER OF
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
In enacting ERISA, Congress created a complex, detailed
scheme, and questions of ERISA liability require a close examination
of its provisions." However, the anticutback provision's language and
legislative history provide few clues as to whether protection extends
to contingent early retirement benefits. There are two key questions to
be considered in examining the text and legislative history: whether
the definition of "retirement-type subsidy" includes plant shutdown
benefits and whether a benefit contingent on an event that has not yet
occurred can ever be protected as an accrued benefit under the anti-
cutback provision.
A. Can a Plant Shutdown Benefit Be a Retirement-Type Subsidy?
As with any statute, interpretation of ERISA's provisions starts
with the statutory language." The text of the anticutback provision
sheds little light on what exactly a "retirement-type subsidy" is, pro-
80 Richard Imperato, FAS 112: The Latest Entry in Accounting for Benefit Plans, 17 Pension
Section News 1, 22 (1993) (discussing the difficulties of developing actuarial data for different
types of benefits).
81 Hughes Aircraft Company v Jacobson, 525 US 432,447 (1999) (stating that "ERISA is a
'comprehensive and reticulated statute'), quoting Nachman Corp v Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corp, 446 US 359,361 (1980).
82 Hughes, 525 US at 438 (stating that analysis begins with statutory language and also
ends there if language is clear).
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viding only that it is to be defined in Treasury regulations. In the ab-
sence of a regulation defining this term, Section 204(g)'s legislative
history becomes even more useful in understanding its meaning." The
Senate Report specifically addresses plant shutdown benefits and
provides:
The bill provides that the term "retirement-type subsidy" is to be
defined by Treasury regulations. The committee intends that un-
der these regulations, a subsidy that continues after retirement is
generally to be considered a retirement-type subsidy. The com-
mittee expects, however, that a qualified disability benefit, a
medical benefit, a social security supplement, a death benefit (in-
cluding life insurance), or a plant shutdown benefit (that does not
continue after retirement age) will not be considered a retirement-
type subsidy.8"
Courts have interpreted this paragraph in conflicting ways. In
Ross, the Sixth Circuit interpreted the anticutback provision narrowly
to exclude all plant shutdown benefits given this language. 8 Because
the legislative history expressly mentions plant shutdown benefits, the
Ross court concluded that plant shutdown benefits in general cannot
be considered a retirement-type subsidy.K
On the other hand, the Third Circuit in Bellas interpreted the leg-
islative history to be more inclusive.' The Bellas court read the phrase
"that does not continue after retirement age" as qualifying plant shut-
down benefits generally, and the court concluded that Congress in-
tended to separate out plant shutdown benefits that end at normal re-
tirement age from those benefits that continue beyond." Similarly, the
Ninth Circuit in Richardson concluded that Congress intended "re-
tirement-type subsidy" to include "shutdown benefits that do continue
after retirement age. '
83 See notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
84 See Varity Corp v Howe, 516 US 489,496-97,512-13 (1996) (using ERISA's legislative
history to interpret ERISA section 404).
85 S Rep No 98-575 at 30, reprinted in 1984 USCCAN at 2576 (cited in note 28) (emphasis
added). •
86 See Ross, 847 F2d at 333 (holding that a shutdown benefit is not a retirement-type sub-
sidy). For further discussion of Ross, see text accompanying notes 53-56.
87 Id ("The legislative history of the Retirement Equity Act, however, specifically ad-
dresses the question of whether a plant shutdown benefit falls within the category of a retire-
ment-type subsidy and specifically states that it does not.").
88 See Bellas, 221 F3d at 533 (holding that a shutdown benefit is a retirement-type sub-
sidy). See also notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
89 Id ("As stated, the Senate Report addressing the amendment of section 204(g) suggests
that shutdown benefits continuing beyond normal retirement age are retirement-type benefits.").
90 See Richardson, 67 F3d at 1468 (interpreting Senate Report and finding shutdown bene-
fits protected as a retirement-type subsidy). See also notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
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The Senate Report's reference to welfare benefits that are not
considered a retirement-type subsidy, such as medical and disability
benefits, is also important in considering plant shutdown benefits.9'
This statement may provide additional support for a narrow reading
of the legislative history to exclude plant shutdown benefits from
Section 204(g) protection. Generally, ERISA's drafters excluded such
benefits to preserve employer flexibility and contain pension costs."
One reason given for allowing employers to amend welfare benefits is
that the level of future benefits is difficult to predict and depends on a
wide range of unpredictable factors.9 For example, future medical in-
surance costs depend on inflation, changes in medical practice and
technology, and increases in the cost of treatment."4 Similarly, retire-
ment benefits contingent on a plant shutdown are also difficult to pre-
dict."
Contingent early retirement benefits, however, can be distin-
guished from other welfare benefits. First, unlike severance payments,
which are generally made in one lump-sum payment, contingent re-
tirement benefits are paid in monthly installments over time and are
therefore more like traditional retirement benefits. Additionally, wel-
fare benefits are generally services that do not depend on long-term
service with the employer,2 and, as employees change jobs, these
benefits will usually be available from the new employer.97 Contingent
early retirement benefits, on the other hand, are conditioned on long
terms of service with the employer, and an employee who changes
jobs will not be eligible for similar benefits from a new employer for a
considerable time.
Both the qualifying phrase following plant shutdown benefits and
the distinctions from welfare benefits seem to point toward a reading
of the term "retirement-type subsidy" that includes contingent retire-
ment benefits continuing past retirement age. Even under an inclusive
91 S Rep No 98-575 at 30, reprinted in 1984 USCCAN at 2576 (cited in note 28). See also
note 50 (describing welfare benefits).
92 See Bruce, Pension Claims at 197 & n 43 (cited in note 63), quoting 2 ERISA Leg Hist
3306 ("To require the vesting of these ancillary benefits [such as medical insurance or life insur-
ance] would seriously complicate the administration and increase the cost of plans.").
93 Moore v Metropolitan Life Insurance Co, 856 F2d 488, 492 (2d Cir 1988) (discussing
Congress's recognition that it is difficult to predict future needs and costs for welfare plans and
excluding them from ERISA's automatic vesting provisions).
94 Id.
95 See text accompanying notes 78-80.
96 See Langbein and Wolk, Pension and Employee Benefit Law at 508 (cited in note 18)
(discussing the transitory, short-term nature of welfare benefits).
97 See Bruce, Pension Claims at 197-98 n 43 (cited in note 63), quoting 2 ERISA Leg Hist
3306 ("[W]here the employee moves from one employer to another, the ancillary benefits ...
would often be provided by the new employer, whereas the new employer normally would not
provide pension benefits based on service with the old employer.").
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reading of the legislative history, however, it is still not clear how to
determine whether the subsidy continues after retirement. Assume,
for example, that John Smith receives his normal, unreduced pension
amount of $1,000 beginning at the time of plant closure and continu-
ing beyond his normal retirement age of sixty-five. Assume also that
Smith's actuarially reduced pension benefits would be $600 if he re-
tired early. Neither the language of Section 204(g) nor the Senate Re-
port makes clear if Smith is receiving $600 per month in early retire-
ment benefits plus $400 per month in plant shutdown benefits or
$1,000 per month in plant shutdown benefits until age sixty-five, when
normal pension payments begin. Thus, although the legislative history
indicates that a plant shutdown benefit that continues beyond retire-
ment age may be a "retirement-type subsidy," it remains unclear how
to apply that definition.
B. Is a Contingent Benefit Considered Accrued Prior to the
Triggering Event?
Even if a plant shutdown benefit is considered to be a retirement-
type subsidy, the second issue that must be addressed is whether a
contingent benefit can be considered protected if the triggering event
has not yet occurred. The text of the anticutback provision indicates
that once a benefit is defined as a "retirement-type subsidy" it is nec-
essarily an accrued benefit and therefore protected." Section 204(g)
initially provides that an "accrued benefit" may not be decreased by a
plan amendment.9 The provision then goes on to state that "a plan
amendment which has the effect of eliminating or reducing ... a re-
tirement-type subsidy ... with respect to benefits attributable to ser-
vice before the amendment shall be treated as reducing accrued bene-
fits.'.' A straightforward reading of the language suggests that once a
contingent retirement benefit is considered to be a "retirement-type
subsidy" it is necessarily an accrued benefit and therefore cannot be
amended.
However, there is some confusion in treating contingent benefits
as accrued benefits because ERISA generally uses the term "accrual"
to refer to the accumulation of benefits over a period of time, such as
years of employment.'' Because the employee does not become enti-
98 See Part II.A (discussing whether plant shutdown benefits are considered retirement-
type subsidies).
99 29 USC § 1054(g)(1).
100 29 USC § 1054(g)(2).
101 See Langbein and Wolk, Pension and Employee Benefit Law at 132-34 (cited in note 18)
(discussing accrual over time). ERISA's definition of "accrued benefit" is not helpful because it




tied to contingent plant shutdown benefits until the shutdown occurs,
these benefits cannot accrue over time in the same way as normal re-
tirement benefits that depend only on age or service.'
Despite the difficulty in categorizing plant shutdown benefits as
accrued, the text of Section 204(g) appears to protect them from
amendment. The anticutback provision applies to participants "who
satisf[y] (either before or after the amendment) the pre-amendment
conditions for the subsidy."'03 In the case of contingent plant shutdown
benefits, the conditions the employee must meet to receive benefits
are age, years of service, and termination due to a plant shutdown. The
"before or after amendment" language in the provision indicates that
the benefits cannot be reduced even if the employee has not yet met
all three of these conditions. Therefore, although the plant shutdown
has not occurred, benefits may still be protected. Further, as the Bellas
court observes, nothing in Section 204(g)'s language distinguishes be-
tween contingent and noncontingent benefits," '
The text of the anticutback provision indicates that Congress in-
tended to protect contingent benefits from amendment despite the
problematic application of the term "accrued benefits." However, nei-
ther the text of Section 204(g) nor its legislative history provides a
great deal of guidance in determining what constitutes a "retirement-
type subsidy" and whether contingent retirement benefits fit within
that definition.
III. CONTINGENT PLANT SHUTDOWN BENEFITS SHOULD BE
PROTECTED UNDER THE ANTICUTBACK PROVISION
Because of the ambiguity in the statute, policy considerations ur-
rounding the application of anticutback protection to contingent early
retirement become important. This Part argues that ERISA's text,
purposes, and statutory scheme justify applying Section 204(g) to pro-
hibit reduction or elimination of contingent early retirement benefits.
Part III.A discusses the strength of employees' expectations with re-
spect to contingent retirement benefits. Part III.B considers the con-
sequences of employers' inability to prefund these benefits and con-
cludes that the need for employer flexibility to amend benefits in light
of this funding gap is overstated. Part III.C evaluates the IRS's inter-
pretation of the IRC's corresponding anticutback provision, and the
consequences of an inconsistent interpretation between the ERISA or
IRC provisions. Finally, Part III.D considers the extent to which em-
102 This is the argument asserted by the employer in Bellas, 221 F3d at 534.
103 29 USC § 1054(g)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
104 Bellas, 221 F3d at 517.
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ployer incentives to offer this type of benefit will be reduced if anti-
cutback protection is extended.
A. Employees Have Strong Expectations of Receiving Contingent
Early Retirement Benefits
ERISA's goal is to provide employees with retirement income
that they have been promised and expect to receive.' As one com-
mentator has observed, "employers do not give pension plans to their
.employees gratuitously,"'' 9 but rather provide retirement benefits gen-
erally as a form of deferred compensation, earned by employees dur-
ing employment and received after retirement.' This expectation ar-
gument may prove too much, however, because all benefits offered by
an employer represent some form of compensation tradeoff, yet not
all benefits are protected to the same extent under ERISA. The em-
ployee may just as equally have traded the contingent plant shutdown
benefits for a better severance package, which is not protected from
reduction or elimination.109
Nonetheless, unlike severance pay, which is ordinarily a lump-sum
payment, contingent early retirement benefits are paid in periodic in-
stallments, making them closer to normal retirement benefits than a
severance plan."' Additionally, the tax advantages to the employee as-
sociated with receiving benefits in monthly installments-during a
time when the employee's taxable income is lower-make it less likely
that employees view early retirement benefits as interchangeable with
lump-sum severance payments.
Finally, employers themselves help to create a strong expectation
interest in contingent plant shutdown benefits. Employers offer this
type of benefit to induce valuable employees, with accumulated ex-
perience and knowledge, to continue to work during troubled times
and plant closings." ' If employees are otherwise eligible to take actu-
105 29 USC § 1001 (1994 & Supp 1998).
106 Dana M. Muir, Note, Changing the Rules of the Game: Pension Plan Terminations and
Early Retirement Benefits, 87 Mich L Rev 1034,1070 (1989) (discussing employee expectations
regarding early retirement benefits).
107 The deferred compensation theory is the common explanation of retirement benefits.
See Langbein and Wolk, Pension and Employee Benefit Law at 16 (cited in note 18) (discussing
the deferred wage theory).
108 Severance plans are considered welfare plans. Under the commonly accepted view, sev-
erance benefits are not a form of deferred compensation, but rather preliquidated unemploy-
ment compensation. See Langbein and Wolk, Pension and Employee Benefit Law at 822 (cited in
note 18).
109 Courts often make this distinction between monthly versus onetime payments in charac-
terizing benefits as ancillary, and therefore not protected under ERISA. See Young v Washington
Gas Light Co, 206 F3d 1200,1203-04 (DC Cir 2000) (finding lump-sum payments are not a bene-
fits plan entitled to ERISA protection).
110 See Renney v A.B. Electrolux, 1992 US App LEXIS 275, *3-5 (6th Cir) (stating that an
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arially reduced early retirement benefits (based on age and service
requirements), the employer may offer them special plant shutdown
benefits if they continue to work until the plant closure. Absent anti-
cutback protection, the employer would be able to eliminate the plant
shutdown benefits and shortly afterward close the plant, leaving the
employee who continued to work with only the original actuarially
reduced pension."' The anticutback provision should be applied to
protect this reliance interest that employers create.
B. Employees Should Not Bear the Risk That Contingent Benefits
Will Be Unfunded
Because employers cannot prefund contingent benefits," ' a fund-
ing gap may result in which liability for benefits exceeds the assets
available if a contingency occurs. This funding gap seems to point to-
ward a narrower reading of the anticutback provision, in order to give
employers flexibility in the face of the "hidden liability" for unfunded
benefits.
This section argues that courts should not read the anticutback
provision to exclude plant shutdown benefits on the basis of the fund-
ing gap, however. This section looks at the text of the anticutback pro-
vision and ERISA's purposes and concludes that Congress has already
addressed the need for employer flexibility in Section 204(g)."3 Fur-
ther, the statutory scheme indicates that Congress has already con-
templated where the risk of underfunding should fall and shifted that
risk away from employees. This section concludes by considering the
effect of anticutback protection in three contexts where the funding
gap may have the greatest impact.
1. The text of the anticutback provision.
It is not necessary to exclude contingent early retirement benefits
entirely from anticutback protection in order to provide the flexibility
that some employers may require to address the funding ap. This
flexibility is already built into the text of the anticutback provision. As
a qualification of its prohibition on amendment of benefits, Section
204(g) provides that benefits may be reduced where required by a
"substantial business hardship.'14 This includes the situation where "it
employer may offer benefits to induce an employee who is tempted to seek other opportunities
when faced with a plant closing to stay and help close down the plant).
Mn Id at*5-6.
112 See Part I.D.
113 See Varity Corp v Howe, 516 US 489, 497 (1996) (interpreting ERISA according to its
language, structure, and purposes, taking into account competing Congressional goals).
114 29 USC § 1054(g); 29 USC § 1082(c)(8).
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is reasonable to expect that the plan will be continued only if the
waiver [of funding liability] is granted..' ..5
Both PBGC, which administers this waiver of liability under
Section 204(g), and courts read the "substantial business hardship"
exception very narrowly."6 The Sixth Circuit has said that a "waiver [of
funding obligations] ordinarily should not be granted when the finan-
cial hardship was the employer's own creation,'"7 but will be consid-
ered only when the company is in financial distress."8 This provision in
Section 204(g) already addresses the situation where employer flexi-
bility to amend plans in light of funding obligations outweighs the
need to protect employee benefits from reduction. It is therefore not
necessary to exclude benefits from anticutback protection to accom-
modate the funding gap employers face.
2. ERISA's purposes.
Although ERISA's primary purpose is to protect employees' ex-
pected benefits," ' Congress was also concerned with containing pen-
sion costs.'20 In close cases, the broad goal of protection of employees
does not necessarily trump the competing goal of employer flexibility
to amend benefits plans.'2' Rather, it is recognized that ERISA reflects
a deal between several competing interests.'22 Where there is a specific
provision that addresses the issue, that provision must decide how to
strike the balance between flexibility to contain pension costs and
employee protection." In the case of anticutback protection for con-
tingent shutdown benefits, although there is a general purpose of em-
ployer flexibility, Section 204(g) also speaks clearly on when that
flexibility is allowed.' The anticutback provision should not be read
to exclude benefits in alignment with the broad goal of employer
115 29 USC § 1083(b)(4).
116 See, for example, A-T-O, Inc v Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 634 F2d 1013,
1022 (6th Cir 1980) (concluding that a waiver is only allowed in cases of financial hardship and
declining to consider other equitable factors).
117 Id.
118 Id ("These safeguards were aimed at preventing undue financial hardship that would
threaten the solvency of a business or would cause a business to curtail or terminate its pension
plan.").
119 See text accompanying notes 13-20.
120 See Mertens v Hewitt Associates, 508 US 248, 262-63 (1993) (discussing the competing
goals of benefiting employees and controlling pension costs).
121 See id (denying relief where doing so would impose high costs on ERISA plans and ad-
visors); Curtiss-Wright Corp v Schoonejongen, 514 US 73, 81 (1995) (rejecting employee claims
that the employer's amendment procedure was inadequate).
122 Mertens, 508 US at 262.
123 Id.
124 See Part III.B.1.
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flexibility when the text already provides the flexibility Congress in-
tended.
3. Statutory scheme and PBGC's termination insurance.
Even if there is a funding gap for contingent benefits, the statu-
tory scheme indicates that employers should not be able to amend
shutdown benefits to alleviate the issues raised by the funding con-
straints. Congress has already allocated the risk of plan underfunding
by providing plan termination insurance to all businesses through the
PBGC.'2 If an employer's plan liability exceeds its assets and it is in fi-
nancial distress, it may terminate the plan.26 PBGC then takes over
and guarantees payment for "all nonforfeitable benefits,''..7 which in-
clude benefits contingent on a plant shutdown.'"
To some extent, shifting the risk to PBGC is an unsatisfactory
solution because employees do not fare as well once PBGC takes over
a plan. For example, certain types of benefit plans are not guaranteed
by PBGC,129 and there is a maximum amount of benefits PBGC can
guarantee.'o Once PBGC takes over the plan, contingent early retire-
ment benefits may be covered, but employees may lose other valuable
benefits in the process.
Still, Congress has clearly addressed the cases in which employer
flexibility to address underfunding is necessary and has provided a
waiver of liability in Section 204(g). In the remainder of cases, Con-
125 29 USC § 1301 et seq (1994 & Supp 1998).
126 29 USC § 1341(c)(2)(B) (1994 & Supp 1998).To terminate a benefit plan voluntarily, the
employer must meet one of the distress criteria: (a) the employer has petitioned for liquidation
in bankruptcy, (b) the business is in the process of reorganization under bankruptcy laws, or (c)
the employer demonstrates to PBGC that it will be unable to continue in business unless the dis-
tress termination occurs. Id. See generally Langbein and Wolk, Pension and Employee Benefit
Law at 828-55 (cited in note 18) (discussing PBGC and termination of plans with insufficient as-
sets).
127 29 USC § 1022(a) (1994 & Supp 1998). Although ERISA does not provide a definition
of a "nonforfeitable benefit" in the context of the termination insurance program, the Supreme
Court has held that a "nonforfeitable benefit" is the same as a vested benefit. See Nachman Corp
v Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp, 446 US 359, 376 (1980). Accrued benefits are earned by the
employee over time, and become vested, nonforfeitable benefits according to the terms of the
plan. For example, an employee begins receiving accrued benefits at the beginning of employ-
ment, but the accrued benefits may only become vested after five years of service. Once the
benefits are vested, the employee has a right to receive his accrued benefit at normal retirement
age, even if his employment is terminated. See Dana M. Muir, Plant Closings and ERISA's Non-
interference Provision, 36 BC L Rev 201,206 (1995) (discussing accrual compared to vesting).
128 Ippolito, Economics of Pension Insurance at 37-38 (cited in note 10) (discussing PBGC's
guarantee of nonforfeitable benefits).
129 For example, state and local plans, foreign plans, and unfunded plans for highly compen-
sated employees are not included. 29 USC § 1321(b).
130 Payment is limited to the lesser of average monthly gross income, based on the highest
compelsation in the past five years, or $3,392.05 per month for plans ending in 2001. 29 USC
§ 1322(b)(3) (1994); 26 USC § 2621.3(b) (1994).
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gress contemplated that employers would address underfunding
through the PBGC's termination insurance program, rather than by
reducing expected benefits.
4. Examples where the funding gap may have an impact.
This section applies the anticutback rule in three contexts in
which the consequences of a funding gap may have the greatest im-
pact: (1) a profitable employer closing an unprofitable plant, (2) an
employer selling a plant, and (3) an unprofitable employer closing a
plant where liability will cause the benefit plan to become under-
funded.
a) Profitable company closing an unprofitable plant. The most
compelling case for extending anticutback protection is the case of an
otherwise profitable company closing down an unprofitable plant.'
Although there may be a gap in funding prior to the contingent event
occurring, a profitable company can transfer funds to the benefits plan
once the decision to shut down the plant occurs, as the funding provi-
sions intend. In this context, extending anticutback protection com-
ports with ERISA's primary purpose of benefiting employees.2 The
liability for contingent plant shutdown benefits represents a cost of
the employer's business that the employer should bear.
1 3
b) Employer selling the plant. The gap between funding and li-
ability may also become an issue when an employer tries to sell a
plant. Even though the sale of the plant will not usually trigger shut-
down benefits,'3' the hidden liability of unfunded contingent retire-
ment benefits may have a large impact on the company's ability to ef-
fect the sale. Prospective buyers may be reluctant to purchase the
plant out of concern that they will assume a benefits plan with an un-
certain amount of future liability and insufficient funds.'35 The seller
may be forced to keep operating a plant that no longer meets its
131 See, for example, A-T-O, Inc v Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp, 634 F2d 1013, 1023 (6th
Cir 1980) (considering waiver of employer liability for closing down an unprofitable plant).
132 Alessi v Raybestos-Manhattan, I c, 451 US 504,515 (1981) (describing ERISA's primary
goal as protecting employees).
133 A-T-O, 634 F2d at 1026 (reasoning that the liability represents "an actual, measurable
cost of ... [the employer's] business"), quoting Usery v Turner Elkhorn Mining Co, 428 US 1, 19
(1976).
134 See, for example, Hickey v Digital Equipment Corp, 43 F3d 941, 947-49 (4th Cir 1995)
(discussing employer liability in the context of a sale).
135 Michael Roknick, Sharon Steel Officially Closes Farrell Mill, Sharon Herald 1 (July 20,
1993) ("Now the plant can be looked at and purchased by an outside concern without worrying
about paying $1 million a month in pension liabilities .... This makes it easier to start up or sell
the mill."). The typical pattern in a sale is for the buying company to take over the seller's pen-
sion plan. Langbein and Wolk, Pension and Employee Benefit Law at 874 (cited in note 18).
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needs, or may take other actions that are worse for employees in the
aggregate, such as idling the plant for an extended period.'
The need for employer flexibility in the context of a sale does not
require a narrow reading of the anticutback provision, however, be-
cause the parties can structure the terms of the sale to address future
liability.'" For example, the companies can contract for the buyer to be
indemnified for pension liability that occurs within a certain time
frame!' Additionally, the seller may terminate the benefits plan at the
time of sale, paying out all accrued benefits and leaving employees
free to become participants in the purchasing company's benefits
plan.'39
c) Employer shutting down due to financial trouble. The third
context in which employer flexibility to eliminate contingent retire-
ment benefits becomes an issue occurs when a company is already fac-
ing financial trouble and liability for these benefits will cause the plan
to become underfunded. In this case, the employer may apply for a
waiver of liability under Section 204(g)'s exception for a substantial
business hardship. If the PBGC does not grant the waiver and requires
the employer to meet its funding obligations, the result may be a dis-
tress termination, under which the PBGC takes over the employer's
plan.
This scenario presents the most compelling case for excluding
contingent shutdown benefits from Section 204(g). Only a small sub-
set of employees will receive the contingent retirement benefits,'
while employees in the aggregate will likely be worse off if the plan
becomes underfunded and results in a distress termination.
Although both protecting employee benefits and maintaining
employer flexibility are important goals of ERISA, Congress has al-
ready addressed the need for employer flexibility to deal with under-
funding. The text of Section 204(g) sets out a clear exception to the
employer's funding obligation for a substantial business hardship.
Where that waiver does not operate, Congress established a termina-
tion insurance program so that employees would not bear the risk of
136 Michael Roknick, USW Leader Sees Hope That 720 May be Able to Retire, Sharon Her-
ald 1 (July 2, 1993) (discussing idling of plant).
137 See Richard D. Nix and Timothy Verrall, Employee Benefit Issues in Mergers and Acqui-
sitions, 25 Okla City L Rev 435 (2000) (discussing methods of structuring transactions to address
unfunded pension liabilities).
138 See Richardson v Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp, 112 F3d 982,986 (9th Cir 1997)
(upholding agreement o pay plant shutdown benefits if a shutdown occurred within forty-eight
months of the sale).
139 Langbein and Wolk, Pension and Employee Benefit Law at 874 (cited in note 18); 26
USC § 411(d)(3).
140 Muir, 36 BC L Rev at 221 (cited in note 127) (discussing the limited nature of special
early retirement benefits).
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underfunding. Taken together, the text, purposes, and statutory
scheme mean that it is not necessary to read the anticutback provision
narrowly to address employer flexibility concerns because Congress
has already done so.
C. The IRS's Interpretation of the Anticutback Provision Does
Not Control
Courts may still interpret ERISA Section 204(g) to prohibit re-
duction of contingent early retirement benefits despite the IRS's con-
trary interpretation in GCM 39869, which states that the IRC's anti-
cutback provision does not disqualify a plan for tax benefits if the em-
ployer reduces these benefits." The IRS's interpretation does not war-
rant strong deference. Additionally, although employers have relied on
the IRS interpretation, courts have discretion to avoid retroactively
applying the anticutback provision if doing so will produce inequitable
results due to employer reliance on the IRS interpretation.
1. Agency deference.
Ordinarily, courts will use the IRC as a tool to interpret ambigu-
ous ERISA provisions, including other terms in Section 204(g).2
There is also a great deal of deference to agency interpretations of
programs they administer, 14 3 particularly in the context of ERISA be-
cause of the greater expertise of the IRS and PBGC as well as the
need for uniformity.'"
There are several factors, however, that caution against adopting
the IRS's interpretation in GCM 39869. First, it is ERISA that sets out
rights and duties, while the IRC merely provides the tax incentives.
14
An ambiguous issue should be resolved by reference to employee in-
terests, rather than driven by the tax incentives already established.
141 General Counsel Memorandum 39869 (cited in note 68).
142 See, for example, Gillis v Hoechst Celanese Retirement Plan, 4 F3d 1137, 1144 (3d Cir
1993) ("[W]hen interpreting Section 204(g) of ERISA, in addition to the statute's legislative his-
tory, we may also look for guidance to sources which interpret its IRC counterpart -Section
411(d)(6)."). See also Hughes Aircraft Co v Jacobson, 525 US 432,442-43 n 4 (1999) (supporting
its decision by reasoning that it is consistent with the IRS interpretation); Patterson v Shumate,
504 US 753,759 (1992) (using IRC section 401(a)(13) to interpret ERISA sect ion 206).
143 Chevron USA Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837, 843 (1984)
(noting that deference is appropriate where the agency's interpretation "is based on a permissi-
ble construction of the statute").
144 Muir, Note, 87 Mich L Rev at 1062-63 (cited in note 106) (discussing appropriate level
of deference to IRS).
145 Rybarczyk v TRW, Inc, 235 F3d 975, 985 (6th Cir 2000) ("[A]djudication of [an em-
ployee's] rights is for the federal courts, not the ... IRS."), quoting Esden v Bank of Boston, 229
F3d 154,177 (2d Cir 2000).
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Second, as a matter of administrative law, an agency interpreta-
tion is entitled to less deference when it is not in the form of a treas-
ury regulation or revenue ruling.'" A General Counsel Memorandum
represents only the opinion of a lawyer within the agency."' Finally,
PBGC is also an agency responsible for administering ERISA, and it
has taken a stronger position on protecting shutdown benefits, consid-
ering them to be nonforfeitable benefits.'4
2. Employer reliance.
Interpreting the anticutback provision as extending to contingent
early retirement benefits, contrary to the IRS's position for the past
ten years, may upset notions of fairness. Many employers relied on the
IRS interpretation before reducing this type of benefit. These employ-
ers may find themselves facing not only liability under ERISA, but
possible disqualification for tax benefits, despite reasonable reliance
on GCM 39869.'49
There are two ways to address the concern about possible tax
disqualification. First, many employers received determination letters
from the IRS prior to amending the plan, which will protect against
disqualification in individual cases."' Second, courts can avoid apply-
ing section 411(d)(6) retroactively if doing so would result in disquali-
fication and the employer reasonably relied on GCM 39869. The Su-
preme Court has addressed retroactive liability in pension cases pre-
viously, and provided a three-prong test for determining whether the
employer should be liable: (1) whether the decision establishes a new
principle of law, (2) whether retroactive awards are necessary to deter
deliberate violations, and (3) whether retroactive liability would pro-
duce inequitable results.''
146 See Tupper v United States, 134 F3d 444,448 (1st Cir 1998) ("GCM's may be looked at as
a research tool by any interested court or party, but they are not authority in this court."); In re
Gulf Pension Litigation, 764 F Supp 1149,1163 n 4 (S D Tex 1991) (rejecting interpretation in an
IRS Plan Termination Handbook).
147 Stubbs, Overbeck & Associates, Inc v United States, 445 F2d 1142,1146-47 (5th Cir 1971)
(rejecting the argument that a revenue ruling has the force and effect of law).
148 Ippolito, Economics of Pension Insurance at 38 (cited in note 10) (discussing PBGC's
guarantee of nonforfeitable benefits as well as how 29 USC § 2621.4 has been interpreted to in-
clude pre-termination shutdown benefits).
149 See Bellas, 221 F3d at 539 (finding that contingent early retirement benefits are pro-
tected by the anticutback provision, but noting that "we do not suggest that employers have not
relied reasonably on GCM 39869").
150 See Esden v Bank of Boston, 229 F3d 154, 176 (2d Cir 2000) (stating that a "favorable
determination letter indicates only that an employee retirement plan qualifies for favorable tax
treatment"); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans
in Support of Appellants, Bellas v CBS, Inc at *23-24 (cited in note 77) (discussing employers'
reliance on determination letters).
151 See Florida v Long, 487 US 223,230 (1988). See also Muir, Note, 87 Mich L Rev at 1067-
68 (cited in note 106) (applying the retroactivity analysis to determine if early retirement benefit
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An employer would probably meet the first prong of the test be-
cause of the lack of clarity surrounding contingent early retirement
benefits. As to the second prong, disqualification of the plan would not
likely be necessary to ensure that employers comply in the future. Fi-
nally, retroactive disqualification would produce inequitable results
for both employers and employees, who would be subject to taxes on
the benefits plan, despite reasonable reliance on the IRS memo. ' Ap-
plying this retroactivity analysis, it is not necessary to deny anticut-
back protection for all contingent early retirement benefits to avoid
inequity resulting from reliance on the IRS interpretation.
D. Employers Will Still Have Incentives to Offer Contingent
Retirement Benefits
Although employers have argued that incentives to offer contin-
gent early retirement benefits will be diminished if they lose flexibility
to amend them later,"3 there are still incentives to offer these benefits.
In particular, contingent early retirement benefits are valuable tools to
induce employees, especially those with years of service and accumu-
lated knowledge, to stay and help the employer close the plant.M In
general, employers have incentives to offer attractive benefit plans
because of their role in attracting workers, improving morale, and in-
creasing employee retention.'
It is true to some extent that employers will be reluctant to offer
benefits that will become a permanent part of the benefits plan. How-
ever, shutdown benefits are important to unions," ' who will still likely
bargain for them. Additionally, employers may still prefer to offer this
type of benefit rather than a wage increase because it does not require
as much immediate cash and is guaranteed by the government.'57 Fi-
nally, the employer's need to encourage experienced workers to con-
payments should be paid for plans with excess assets terminated before 1984).
152 See Bellas, 221 F3d at 539.
153 Id (rejecting arguments that employers will be discouraged from offering future shut-
down benefits).
154 See Renney v A.B. Electrolux, 1992 US App LEXIS 275, *2-5 (6th Cir) (noting that
benefits are offered to employees as an incentive to retain employees during shutdown). See also
Bradley R. Schiller and Randall D. Weiss, The Impact of Private Pensions on Firm Attachment, 61
Rev Econ and Stat 369, 379 (1979) (concluding that retirement benefits, including special early
retirement benefits, do affect employees' decisions to stay with employers).
155 Muir, Note, 87 Mich L Rev at 1065-66 (cited in note 106).
156 See Joel Chernoff, Government Hits at Underfunding, Pension and Investments 1, 35
(Aug 20,1990) (noting that unions "fiercely guard" contingent benefits, including plant shutdown
benefits).
157 See David A. Vise, Putting Pension Reforms into Gear, Wash Post F1 (Apr 16, 1993) (dis-
cussing role of pension benefits in labor talks).
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tinue to work through troubled times means employers will consider
offering early retirement benefits contingent on a plant shutdown.'
The role of collective bargaining in shaping the terms of benefits
plans may reduce the need to use the anticutback provision to protect
benefits. Employees who want additional protection from cutbacks
can bargain to include provisions in the plan limiting the employer's
discretion to eliminate benefits.'59 For example, the collective bargain-
ing agreement may require agreement from union leaders before
shutdown benefits are reduced.' In practice, however, this type of
provision may offer only nominal protection to employees, who are
relatively powerless at the point where the decision is made to shut
down a plant."'1 Additionally, non-unionized employees or those with
nonbargained plans could be left without any protection.
CONCLUSION
Courts have struggled with the appropriate scope of the anticut-
back rule and its application to contingent early retirement benefits.
Authority has been split, deciding the issue largely as a matter of
statutory interpretation. Although the text and legislative history are
inconclusive, policy considerations favor protecting contingent early
retirement benefits from reduction or elimination. Employers offer
this type of benefit to induce employees to continue to work despite a
plant's declining financial situation, helping to create the type of ex-
pectation that the anticutback provision is intended to protect. Al-
though employers are limited in their ability to prefund for contingent
benefits, Congress has already shifted the risk of underfunding away
from employees and created an exception for employers in cases of
business hardship. Finally, anticutback protection will not eliminate
employers' incentives to offer contingent early retirement benefits.
This type of benefit is a valuable tool to induce employees with ex-
perience and knowledge to remain with the employer. The anticut-
back provision should be read to prohibit employers from amending
the benefits they have offered and that employees reasonably expect.
158 See Renney, 1992 US App LEXIS 275 at *8-9 (discussing the role of contingent plant
shutdown benefits in inducing employees to continue to work).
159 See Hozier v Midwest Fasteners, Inc, 908 F2d 1155, 1162 (3d Cir 1990) (noting that "em-
ployees and their unions remain free to bargain" to limit the employer's ability to make amend-
ments, beyond the requirements in the statute); Corcoran v Bell Atlantic Corp, 1997 US Dist
LEXIS 14662, *16 (E D Pa) (noting that pension plans can be drafted to extend protection be-
yond what Section 204(g) offers).
160 See, for example, Hagan v Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp, 668 F Supp 1298, 1300
(E D Mo 1987) (describing terms of the collective bargaining agreement).
161 See Hagan, 668 F Supp at 1299-1300 (describing actions of union president agreeing un-
der protest to plan amendments eliminating retirement benefits after the employer threatened
to shut down the plant).
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